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Abstract
The European Union is facing the collapse of traditional democracy. Immersed in an unprecedented economical 
crisis, new thesis are emerging that indicate that it might be time to move forward to a new kind of more 
communicative and participative government. This paper examines whether there is a single or multiple 
European public spheres, and proposes deliberative democracy as the starting point for reforms.
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precedentes, nuevas tesis están suscitando que tal vez sea hora de avanzar hacia un nuevo modelo de gobierno 
más comunicativo y participativo. En este artículo se analiza si existen una o varias esferas públicas europeas, y 
se propone la democracia deliberativa como el punto inicial en la que las reformas podrían comenzar.
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Persons do not become a society by living in physical proximity, any more than a 
man ceases to be socially influenced by being so many feet or miles removed from 
others. Individuals do not even compose a social group because they all work for 
a common end. What they must have in common in order to form a community or 
society are aims, beliefs, aspirations, knowledge -- a common understanding.
(John Dewey in Democracy and Education, 1916)
1.  Introduction
For the past three decades, there has been an increase in the number 
of articles, reports, and other documents focusing their research on the European 
public sphere, as a result of the unstoppable growth experienced by the European 
Union since the 1980s (Baldwin, Haapararanta, Kiander, 1995; Elvert, Kaiser, 
2013). It is argued that the Treaty of Maastricht is under quarantine due to a 
democratic deficit within European countries. The possible reasons for this 
include the deficiency of transparency in governments, the lack of media reforms, 
and the absence of a common public sphere. These causes have made European 
citizens develop an unexpected level of scepticism towards their respective local 
governments, and ultimately towards the European Union. Along these lines, 
Martin Kettle, an associate editor of The Guardian and a renowned journalist in 
the area of European politics, media and law, wrote in 2005, long before the 
economic crisis hit Europe, an open critique on the public discourse: “the art of 
talking, the thing that makes human beings what they are, has become a refuge 
for recusants. The current public discourse has become unworthy of the name 
and will remain so unless and until we decide to change it” (Kettle, 2005). 
When the European Union countries were preparing to achieve one of 
the Union’s long-standing aspirations, its own currency, several authors discussed 
that lack of integration between them and how this was a serious threat for 
future European endeavours (Andersen, Burns, 1996; Rommetsch, Wessels, 
1996; Wincott, 1998). Their research found that becoming a democracy and 
accessing to the European Union was not equivalent to a complete, not even 
progressive, integration into the Union (Brzinski, Lancaster, Tuschhoff, 1999; 
O´Neill 1999; Schmitt, 1999). We now sense that time may have just proved 
them right. Any person following European news knows that each of its member 
states has different laws in all kind of social matters. Many analysts have claimed 
that the different European regulations (or, actually, lack thereof) have created an 
exceptional climate in which the economic crisis has grown beyond expectations 
much to the dissatisfaction of European citizens. Now, the following question 
arises: if the European Union is unable to enact a common policy on its own social 
issues, how could it be possible for a European public sphere to truly exist?
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When Kettle wrote his article, the biggest crisis in Europe was yet to 
come: the economic crack of 2008 and beyond, a crisis provoked precisely due 
to the lack of a common regulation. The years have passed by and, at the time of 
writing this article, the European Union does not just seem far from emerging from 
the economic crisis, but is also immersed in heated debates over its future moves 
as a union. It has also become noticeable to the public that each of the European 
countries has a different approach to ending this crisis. Far from displaying an 
image of unity, the European Union is currently perceived by international media 
as a sinking ship –an actual metaphor used by The Wall Street Journal in 2013– 
that cannot really address the actual lack of unity between its members in a 
satisfactory manner. On the flip side of the coin, however, there is an intense 
ongoing work from scholars, professionals and public institutions to push forward 
a common European public sphere. It is argued that, within this common sphere, 
most, if not all, of the issues that the European Union is currently facing could be 
resolved in more successful ways.
This paper accomplishes two main purposes: (1) it analyses the most 
notorious literature on the Habermasian notion of public sphere, including some 
of the most relevant critiques and updates to his theory, as well as the recent 
approaches to a potential European public sphere; and (2) embraces some of the 
most significant discussions revolving around the theory of deliberative democracy 
and presents it as a possible departure point for a democratic reform that would 
ultimately lead to an actual European public sphere.
2.  Debating the public sphere
Debate on the concept of public sphere is not new. Ever since the 
German sociologist Jürgen Habermas extensively theorized about it in his 1962 
book The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, in the past few decades 
several authors –some of which are cited here– have put forward different theses 
revolving around the possibility of a common public sphere for the European Union. 
As will been seen further on, these theories range from a single, elite-oriented 
public sphere to a multiple range of public spheres, each of which would consist 
of multiple layers. While the form of the sphere appears to be different in each 
thesis, the substance remains the same, and could be summarized with the aim 
of helping political and social processes move towards a major democratization. 
At the time when Habermas published his conceptualization of the public 
sphere, it was only his second book to be published, and the first to be written by 
him alone. His work had immediate repercussions, and his theories served as the 
central pillar to many other sociological, political, and communicational theories 
that are still studied today. Some of the names that will be cited here include 
James Calhoun, Thomas McCarthy and Seyla Benhabib, as some of the most 
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prominent thinkers on the Habermasian notion of public sphere. This is how the 
German sociologist envisioned the sphere in his early studies:
The bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the 
sphere of private people coming together as public; they soon 
claimed the public sphere regulated from above against the 
public authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate over 
the general rules governing relations in the basically privatized 
but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social 
labour (Habermas, 1989: 27).
Habermas thus defined the public sphere as a space comprised 
of individuals who take active part in state authority. Note the word bourgeois, 
as it becomes central to understanding both the praise and critiques that the 
German sociologist has received. According to his studies, the first traces of the 
public sphere are found in 18th century society. At that time, the literacy rate was 
rapidly increasing, and a new type of more rational and critical journalism was 
successfully emerging. All together, these causes helped to foster a new kind of 
educated and informed bourgeois that began to question the absolutist power. In 
a 1991 MIT Press re-edition of The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 
McCarthy observed the new paradigm of the epoch, consisting of a totem of power 
that could not be reached, nor discussed within a public sphere: “In its clash 
with the arcane and bureaucratic practices of the absolutist state, the emergent 
bourgeoisie gradually replaced a public sphere, in which the ruler’s power was 
merely represented before the people with a sphere, in which state authority was 
publicly monitored through informed and critical discourse by the people.” As 
noted by Habermas and McCarthy, the emergence of the bourgeoisie changed 
the individuals in the public sphere from mere observers to active and critically 
thinking subjects.
In his work, Habermas observes a rise and decline of the public sphere 
in two separate stages. Needless to say, the prominent influence of his mentors 
Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer can be seen in his words, although he would 
subsequently differentiate his thought from theirs. According to his theories, the 
first shift in the public sphere occurred throughout the 18th century until the late 
first half of the 19th century. The German sociologist cites several thinkers as part 
of this early bourgeoisie shift: Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau and Kant, 
among others. They all belong to what he defines as pre-industrial capitalism. The 
second shift occurred in the 19th century with the actual expansion of consumerist 
capitalism and the rise of new theories as described by Hegel, Marx, Mill, and 
Tocqueville as some of the most prominent thinkers. This second shift, Habermas 
argues, destroyed the bourgeois public sphere. Along with the emergence of new 
media (new at that time), the public sphere, he says, developed into a space of 
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commercialization and manipulation of ideas. In other words, Habermas notes 
that in the earlier, liberal development of the public sphere, public opinion was 
formed through political debate comprised of common interests, shared between 
the members of the bourgeoisie, whose aim was to form a valid consensus 
useful to all. However, in the contemporary stage of capitalism, he sees the 
public discourse flourishing among dominant elites that represent, for the most 
part, their own particular and private interests. In such cases, he concludes, the 
consensus of the common good is rendered non-existent.  
Another aspect Habermas touched upon was that, if there is a public 
sphere, there must be a private sphere. Since the fall of absolutism, it has been 
a constant trend in political theory to separate politics from the private space, on 
the basis that if the public space is related to political issues, then the private 
space has to be non-political. For instance, the German-American political theorist 
Hannah Arendt is one of the thinkers that have proposed this differentiation. Arendt 
(1985) goes back to Ancient Greece to construct her argumentation. Back then, 
the Greek society was divided into two realms, she says: the public realm, which 
included policy-related activity, and the private realm. For Arendt, freedom could 
be gained in the public realm (an idea first put forward by Aristotle, who is often 
quoted in Arendt’s books). The private realm, on the other hand, is comprised of 
private needs ranging from reproduction to economy. In short, while the private 
sphere represents necessities, the public sphere represents freedom. 
The sociologist Simon Susen (2001) has tackled the public-private 
dichotomy asserting that “since human actors cannot escape the various 
socialization processes imposed upon them by their environment, the purest form 
of privacy cannot eliminate individuals’ dependence upon society. Individuals can 
assert their privacy only in relation to, rather than in isolation from, the existence of 
other individuals.” From her sociological approach, Susen concludes that the public 
sphere becomes nothing but the socialized expression of individuals’ reciprocally 
constituted autonomy: individuals are autonomous in relation to one another. From 
his words it can be conclude that, even if a public sphere and a private sphere 
existed separately, there would always be a certain degree of space for private 
concerns in the public sphere. While we believe that this collision has not been 
studied enough in terms of a European public sphere, we will further argue that 
deliberative democracy may be able to successfully overcome this dichotomy. 
3.  Critiques to the public sphere of Habermas
The main critiques on Habermas’ conception of the public sphere revolve 
around the fact that, in order to be part of the public sphere, individuals must 
be well educated and trained, which was largely impossible considering the living 
conditions in the 18th century and beyond. These assessments range from those 
E-ISSN:2173-1071  IC – Revista Científica de Información y Comunicación 10 (2013) [pp. 121-140]
126 Marc Perelló i Sobrepere
that discuss Habermas’ idea of the public sphere to those that deny its existence. 
Susen wrote in this regard that “to reduce the complexity of the modern public 
sphere to the singularity of the bourgeois public sphere means to underestimate 
the sociological significance of alternative  —i.e. non-bourgeois— collective realms 
that contribute to a rational, critical engagement with the world” (Susen, 2011, 
p.52). In the same vein, theorist Nicholas Garnham elaborates: “[Habermas] 
neglects the importance of the contemporaneous development of a plebeian public 
sphere alongside and in opposition to the bourgeois public sphere, a sphere built 
upon different institutional forms” (Garnham, 1992, p.352). Author Sean Cubbit 
appears to be even more pessimistic in this respect: “To some extent, the public 
sphere has never existed, or has existed only by dint of its exclusions: the poor, 
women, slaves, migrants, the criminalized, and in the current context animals. The 
public remains an ideal form, and though our conceptions have changed since 
Kant, that ideal is still to a grand extent what Habermas might call an unfinished 
project of modernity” (Cubbit, 2005, p.93).
Susen and Garnham remind us of the need to think of the public sphere 
as a wide open space with sufficient capacity to contain the majority of the society, 
understanding this majority as one that has the capacity to communicate and 
access several mediums of communication. Otherwise, an analysis limited to 
the study of the bourgeois public sphere runs the risk of excluding other, equally 
important, public spheres from the picture. Not to mention that, implicitly, a 21st 
century only-bourgeois conception of the public sphere would not meet the needs 
of the vast majority of citizens that do not fall under the bourgeois classification –let 
the “We are the 99%” motto serve as an example. Conversely, Cubbit’s pessimism 
may be understood as a call to action to make the public sphere actually visible 
and capable of accommodating a wide range of opinions. Such critiques, we 
believe, are essential in the building of a European public sphere, one that should 
not know any social boundaries. As a side note, Habermas’ work has also been 
questioned in terms of historical account (Baker, 1992; Schudson, 1992), and 
the neglect of minorities (Fraser, 1992). He has also been criticized for believing 
that mass publics are widely manipulative, as his mentors Adorno and Horkheimer 
(1947) had suggested before him. It seems odd that Habermas, who drew an 
elite-driven public discourse, was thought to be “too left wing” by his colleague 
Horkheimer (Wiggerhaus, 1995), and yet at the same time he was criticized for the 
elite connotations of his thesis. In any case, it becomes clear under the light of 
history that as ancient regimes, such as monarchies, lost power (i.e.: The French 
Revolution and The Independence of the United States), more people became 
involved in political discussion, turning them into active citizens. 
From the middle of the 20th century and beyond, the scrutiny that 
individuals exercised on politics demanded a different way to present political 
processes to people. As noted by many authors (Postman, 1985; Bourdieu, 1998), 
television changed the way politics used to worked, and made them hostage to 
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the mechanics of entertainment and electronics, mostly trivializing public opinion 
(Revel, 1988). Those were the ages of multimedia news. video, audio, and images 
combined for a brand new approach to politics with its pros and cons, widely touched 
upon by the aforementioned authors, and others such as McLuhan, Castells and 
De Kerckhove. After television, we would still have to wait four more decades for the 
next greatest shift of all: digital media (Pavlik, 2008; Levinson, 2009). The Internet 
and the subsequent influx of information technology and digital devices that have 
been developed to date have marked the latest switch in political discussion. The 
public sphere has expanded farther than ever, and individuals within it have taken 
the influence of public opinion to a whole new level as well. In parallel, the increase 
in the flow of information leads to a concept that is rarely discussed and that we 
would like to touch on briefly: misunderstanding. There have been countless times 
when journalists, politicians and other institutional officials have had to rephrase 
or retract their words due to one or more agents in the chain of communications 
misunderstanding their significance and therefore understanding a completely 
different message. In fact, this is a recurrent exercise in any communication class. 
Tell a student one sentence containing valuable information, have him or her retell 
it to another student, and so on until the message gets back to the original sender. 
The chances are that the returned message will probably have little resemblance 
to what was initially sent out. Be it an unconscious misinterpretation of the words 
or a deliberate reframing of the sentence, yet in the end the message has changed 
substantially. Lack of attention and reframing are extremely serious issues as yet 
to be corrected (Iyengar, 1991; Bennett, 2011). In this sense, we may conclude 
that while it is true that campaigns increase public attention to politics (Hix, 2003), 
these campaigns might not necessarily push public opinion in the direction that 
was originally intended. Due to these cognitive limitations, the question arises of 
whether or not we can trust the current public sphere as a rational or even critical 
one –an idea that will be further addressed in Section 4 of this paper.
As mentioned before, in the early works of Habermas and Arendt, it is 
possible to sense some disappointment with the 20th century public sphere, as 
both authors agree that it may have been seriously corrupted by capitalism and 
self-needs. In his most recent work, however, Habermas (2009) appears to have 
reconciled himself with the potential of the sphere. The differentiation of the spheres 
is not made any more in terms of public and private –terms clearly attached to a 
specific political thought belonging to the 20th century– but uses instead the words 
“institutionalized” and “informal.” While the former represents the political system, 
the latter embraces citizens. Institutionalized bodies (i.e., governments) have the 
responsibility to act and exert power on a quick basis, depriving them of deliberative 
processes –this idea will be taken up again further on. At most, informal spheres 
can have a broader flow of information and communication processes capable of 
unveiling the critical potential of citizens. That is, of course, if citizens are willing to 
collaborate with and participate in communication power. 
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After reviewing an extensive literature on the public sphere and the 
arguments for and against it, we propose a classification of what we consider to be 
five distinguishable stages in the formation of the public sphere in contemporary 
history: (1) An initial stage: individuals in the public sphere could only see the 
power holder but could not discuss the issue any further due to an intentional 
lack of information; (2) A youth stage: after absolutism, democracy allowed for 
literate individuals to participate to some extent in the public sphere with critical 
yet elite-oriented discussions on power; (3) An intermediate stage: coming hand-
in-hand with the expansion of literacy and the goods of the electronic age, people 
began to take an active part in the political discourse and public opinion gained 
enormous influence; (4) A mature stage: digital media now allows for live coverage 
of and discussion on the political discourse, opening the way to citizen activism, 
gatherings and protests, ultimately leading to a scenario where the public space 
can have an actual influence on power; and finally (5) A full circle stage: the public 
discourse reaches higher-than-ever levels thanks to transparency, media reform, 
and cooperative deliberation (this last characteristic will be covered in more depth 
below), allowing for a true, critical, rational and transnational public sphere. 
We maintain that we are now living in the fourth stage, essentially at 
the very beginning of it. The collapse of the economy, and the impossibility for 
current democracy to address the problem, has encouraged the birth of many 
movements aiming to change democratic processes for the better. For instance: 
the Arab Spring demonstrations, the Indignados in Spain, and the Occupy Wall 
Street movement. As studied by many theorists, these activists owe much of their 
success to the social networks. While it is impossible to summarize the complexity 
of social networks in few words, it is nonetheless remarkable that in the same way 
that they have exposed politics to public scrutiny, these networks have also allowed 
for the aforementioned bottom-up associations to gather and disseminate their 
ideals within the new media. The mediation that these activists have constructed 
around the most modern and non-traditional channels such as YouTube, Twitter and 
Facebook, and dedicated projects such as Anonymous or WikiLeaks, have certainly 
set a milestone in history, as they have made the old and traditional media turn to 
them as well, instead of reporting on the official agenda only. Hence, many steps are 
taken on a daily basis towards a mature democracy, or post-democracy, if preferred, 
but this stage has yet to be implemented and become tangible. The fourth stage, 
bursting with cooperation and information sharing, is just the beginning. 
4.  Europe and its own public sphere
In spite of the political kaleidoscope of the different governments in 
Europe, and whether they lean towards the left or the right, current democracy is 
faithful reflection of liberalism: free people, free market, and the winner takes all. 
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Citizens come together on the basis of their political affiliation and use their vote 
to allow political parties to alternate in government. While local politics are clear 
to everyone, the European governments still have to synergize with one another. 
In the meantime, current liberal democracy assumes that the opinion shared 
by the majority will democratically prevail over all other opinions, producing the 
mirage effect of a cohesive, common public opinion. The resulting public sphere 
is adopted as a faithful representation of standard western democracies, where 
social policies are seen as the guardians of freedom and equality, and where 
governments aim to interfere as little as possible in the private sphere. While 
this may sound pretty acceptable in theory, the reality has proven otherwise, as 
denounced by Julian Assange and Edward Snowden, among others. Information 
leaks have marked a before and an after in governmental transparency and 
also in the way journalism is practised (Brevini, Hintz, McCurdy, 2013). While a 
description of the pros and cons of transparency is not within the purpose of this 
paper, it must be noted that, no matter what liberal, social, or any other democracy 
exists, transparency must play an essential role in it as both a right and a duty. 
It makes societies and governments more efficient and dynamic, and prevents 
misinformation. Furthermore, transparency has an ethical attractiveness that fits 
perfectly into the (already ethical) processes within public spheres. 
On addressing an alleged European public sphere, scholars have long 
questioned whether it exists or not, and if it does, how it works. Schlesinger 
(1997) and Kevin (1997, 2000) have concluded, on the basis of both empirical 
and theoretical considerations, that there will never be just one European public 
sphere, but rather a multiplicity of public spheres. Of all these multiple spheres, 
one that attracts our attention for professional reasons is an academic sphere, 
separate from other public spheres. This possibility has been both denied (Shils, 
1997) and asserted (Griffler, Varghese, 2004), although always as a consequence 
of something else. Judging from the great number of European scientific journals, 
conferences, and other meetings it seems rather plausible to argue that an 
academic sphere actually exists and that it is dissolving national boundaries. The 
European Parliament is heading in this direction every time it appoints a panel of 
experts, where scholars are invited to participate in a transnational discussion on 
relevant issues. But it definitely needs to do more. In order to have a European 
public sphere, citizens must first transcend their own nationality. If citizens put 
their birth nationality before their European nationally, they are limiting an already 
limited European public sphere: “A European public sphere can arise only if the 
national public spheres become responsive to one another, which would also 
remove the obstacle of multilingualism” (Habermas, 2009: 87). 
The importance of journalistic media is out of discussion. Ever since 
Edmund Burke coined the phrase in a debate in the House of Commons of Great 
Britain back in 1787, the press has become the fourth state (or the fourth power, 
as it is sometimes known), on which citizens should be able to rely (Schultz, 
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1998). But can they? Several studies have argued that the majority of European 
media is either national or sub-national, and also that the few supranational 
channels that indeed exist are either targeted at political or economical elites 
or are too specialized to attract a broad audience (Billig, 1995; Kevin, 2004; 
Zimmermann, Koopmans, 2003). One such example can be seen in the news 
channel Euronews. At the moment of writing this paper, Euronews broadcasts in 
13 languages. The network started broadcasting in six languages on 1 January 
1993: English, French, Spanish, German and Italian. Twenty years on, Euronews 
also broadcasts in Portuguese, Russian, Arabic, Turkish, Persian, Ukrainian, Greek 
and Hungarian, the latter being its most recent addition since May 2013. The 
possibility to watch Euronews in Serbian is also in the works, and is expected to 
be introduced in November 2013. This will bring the total up to 14 languages. If 
we take into account that the total number of official European Union languages 
is 23, 14 is definitely not a bad number. Theorist Sue Wright (2000) suggests 
that Euronews goes against the argument that a language barrier is hindering 
the construction of a European public sphere, which is an issue often raised by 
Habermas (2009). On the one hand, Schlesinger and Kevin (2000) are optimistic, 
as we are in this study, that media like The Financial Times, The Economist, and of 
course Euronews, have to be seen and understood as truly pan-European media, 
with which to transcend national borders and ascend to a Europeanized cognitive 
space. This could certainly help in the creation of the much-anticipated European 
public sphere, but it certainly would not be enough. On the other, theorist Jochen 
Peter appears rather pessimist about the possibility of a European public sphere 
and uses his television-related research to assert that “on the map of television 
coverage, the European Union resembles an unknown territory, in which the 
European Union citizen may find him/herself lost. It seems that European Union 
citizens have to orient themselves about the whereabouts of the European Union by 
solely relying on the position of the sun while they urgently also need a compass” 
(Peter, 2003: 173). He concludes that a European public sphere does not exist, 
but admits that there are traces of it in some elite and international media. While 
translational communication may be occurring to some degree in the media and 
also within an academic sphere –as we will note further below– it does not seem 
to have an equivalency on an institutional level. Along the same lines, several 
studies have analyzed the roles of public statements and PR efforts by individuals 
and institutions in this regard, and have concluded that there is still a long way to 
go before developing a proper Europeanized institutional communication keyed to 
expanding trust, knowledge and collaboration among the European states (Peter 
2003, Slaatta 2001).
Koopmans and Statham (2010) have also tackled the European public 
sphere from another medium: the press. From 2001 to 2004 they conducted 
an analysis of several newspapers from seven countries. Among their findings, 
they concluded that while the European Union and its institutions enjoy a broad 
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operational functionality, European journalists seem to lack the interest or time 
to report on European Union policies. The authors likewise conclude that a 
European public sphere does exist, alluding to the importance of the policies 
and prominence of its institutions, but they also admit that the sphere is not as 
inclusive as it should be. The lack of inclusion is easily identifiable: a glance at the 
participation rates in the European Parliament elections in each country, and also 
in the European Constitution referendum, shows very high levels of abstention. 
This enormous lack of interest in European issues expressed at the polls is 
precisely what makes us believe that the European public spheres is not yet a 
reality –as will be elaborated on in the conclusions.
Koopmans and Erbe have rightfully proposed that the density of 
communicative activity within the sphere will eventually determine the existence 
and functionality of a potential European public sphere. It must be remembered, 
however, that not all political communication is calling for political action, and 
much less for social activism. As a result of the various types of information 
communicated through all the media channels, different spheres are created: 
informational, promotional, technical, and even propagandistic. And again, not all 
of them are expected to provoke an active response from the receiver. Now, it 
may be argued that these spheres are not many but just one, and that citizens 
are free to pick the information that they want from a gigantic, multi-layered public 
sphere. In fact, citizens who obtain their information from one single channel, or 
from a few that simply repeat the same messages, may exemplify this behaviour. 
The sole conduct of paying attention to a specific kind of information and source 
while omitting the rest is precisely what is fostering the birth of multiple public 
spheres. These numerous spheres flow between public opinion in parallel, and 
may or may not share information. If one resides in a sphere with no external 
input other than the official source or sources that sustain the sphere and channel 
its information through a single, straight conduit, the critical potential of such a 
sphere is completely lost, and it simply becomes an ego trip of self-reassertion. 
As a result of this, we may not consider all public spheres to have an equal critical 
value. Watch it from this perspective: in current democracy, the citizens elect their 
government, the press reports on the government and opposition, and later on the 
citizens elect either the same government or a different one. This has gone full 
circle; to wit, citizens are actively involved in political matters only once every four 
years or so. Authors like Hix (2003) suggest that this level of implication, although 
limited, allows for a public sphere to a certain degree, as the competition between 
rival candidates for political leadership promotes policy debates and deliberation 
on public policy. While this view could arguably be true, the final question arises 
again of whether or not this minimal public sphere is a rational and critical one, 
and therefore, whether or not it deserves to be called a public sphere. We certainly 
believe that the answer to the question of how to bridge this gap may be found in 
deliberative democracy.
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5.  Deliberative democracy as a starting point
Weber was right: rulers impose their will on others. In fact, current 
democracy has become one where one part of society rules over the other part 
for a specific period of time, and where consensus agreements are few and far 
between. All over Europe, governments range from the quasi-bipartisanship model, 
with two main parties taking turns to wield power every few years, to ungovernable 
parliaments in which many parties rule on the basis of striking highly clean-cut 
deals. The times when two or more parties reach an agreement are seen as a 
marriage of convenience, the result of which is more advantageous to the parties 
than it is to the citizens. The lack of understanding and reasoning within ruling 
parties and their inability to express their ideas in a coherent manner may have 
unconsciously taught citizens that no matter how they vote, politicians will always 
decide what is best for them. This idea can be illustrated by looking at the levels 
of abstention in European countries. For instance, in the last Spanish elections 
in November 2011, the abstention rate was 30.42% , just 0.08% below the 
number of votes obtained by the winning party (31,50%). In similar elections all 
across Europe, the level of abstention has been as high as 75%. In parallel, new 
and old radical parties have subsequently appeared on the European political 
scene, probably as a result of the sectarian culture of modern politics. Therefore, 
a pluralistic European public sphere is urgently needed. As opposed Weber, 
Arendt and Habermas envisioned a much more representative power linked to 
communication. The advent of new information technologies (IT) may have come 
about at the right time for citizens to exercise such power as a plural and well-
informed community. As will now be seen, a good way of achieving a European 
public sphere may be through deliberative politics.
The term deliberative democracy was originally coined by Joseph M. 
Bessette in his 1980 work Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Principle in 
Republican Government, and its goal is to reach consensus by the agreement 
of all those affected by a decision (Bohman, 1998). According to Gutmann and 
Thompson (2004), no subject has been more discussed in political theory in 
the last two decades than deliberative democracy. In the early formulation of 
deliberative democracy in the 1980s, deliberation was opposed to aggregation, in 
the sense that the first resembled a forum, and the latter recreated a market (Knight 
and Johnson, 1994). Habermas is also among the first theorists to approach 
deliberative politics. He does so in his book Between Facts and Norms (1996), and 
again in several others of his most recent publications, such as Europe: the Faltering 
Project (2009). Habermas remarks that in a pluralist democracy the participating 
citizens “need at least a purposive-ration explanation for why the norms passed 
by the majority should be accepted as valid by the outvoted minority” (Habermas, 
1996: 292). Because liberal and republican democracies do not have a process 
of this kind, Habermas defends a deliberative model of democracy that seeks 
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to integrate what he believes to be the best parts of the liberal and republican 
democracies, specifically individual rights and common moralities, while adding 
to them the reason-driven processes of deliberation and rationalization. These 
reasons can be neither merely procedural nor purely substantive, and shall be 
accepted by free and equal people: 
Deliberative democracy affirms the need to justify decision made 
by citizens and their representatives. Both are expected to justify 
the laws they would impose on one another. In a democracy, 
leaders should therefore give reason for their decisions, and 
respond to the reasons that citizens give in return. But not all 
issues, all the time, require deliberation. Deliberative democracy 
makes room for many other forms of decision-making (including 
bargaining among groups, and secret operations ordered by 
executives), as long as the use of these forms themselves 
is justified at some point in a deliberative process. Its first 
and most significant characteristic, then, is its reason-giving 
requirement (Gutmann and Thompson, 2004: 3).
Fishkin (2009) proposes a shorter, but equally understandable, 
meaning of deliberative democracy: “to include everyone under conditions 
where they are effectively motivated to think about the issues.” While the 
substance is ethically commendable, deliberative democracy raises the 
following question: is it possible for all persons in a group to come to terms 
in a final and shared agreement? One of the authors that tackle this issue 
is James Bohman. He asserts that “whatever forms it takes [deliberative 
democracy] must refer to the ideal of public reason, to the requirement that 
legitimate decisions are ones that ‘everyone could accept’ or at least ‘not 
reasonably reject’” (Bohman, 1998). It is in the “at least not reasonably reject” 
where we find the closest appreciation of Habermas’ conceptualization of the 
public sphere: one that is critically and rationally driven. Within the current 
democratic model, legitimization is achieved through the political majorities 
and the representational system. However, this system does not provide 
the reasons why their decisions are good ones. Good reasons, according to 
Bohman (1998: 403), are those that are convincing or correct. These two 
adjectives sum up the purpose of a deliberative democracy: convincing and 
correct decisions shall be those that have been reached through a collaborative, 
critical and rational debate. Therefore, to reach a state where everyone’s 
opinion is arguably politically justified, the author proposes that citizens must 
go beyond their own self-interest, which is the core of the aggregation system 
(highly popular nowadays thanks to bottom-up social movements), and orient 
themselves to the common good (Bohman, 1998: 402). In this regard, theorist 
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Russell Hardin satirizes what he believes to be the most common procedure 
for people when voting –and we certainly share his view:
Many of those who vote do so for moral reasons of their duties or 
the fairness of their doing their part. But many seem genuinely to 
think in their own interest to vote. They invoke a rational choice 
version of the generalization principle in ethics. That moral 
principle is a response to the query: What if everyone did that? 
(…) Many voters seem to believe in a pragmatic (non-moral) 
version of the generalization argument. They feel responsible if, 
after they fail to vote, their party loses. And if their party loses 
after they do vote, they console themselves with the realization 
that at least they tried. If they had merely a moral commitment 
to voting, they should feel guilty for not voting independently of 
whether their party wins or loses. To feel regret because one’s 
party loses makes no sense unless one supposes one might 
actually have made a difference (Hardin, in Fishkin and Laslett, 
2008).
In spite of this, Hardin is actually optimistic and believes that 
deliberative democracy does indeed stand a chance and can expand through 
people since “it is easier to understand the logic of collective action and to 
apply it to real problems of choice than it is to understand, say, the theory of 
relativity, quantum mechanics, or the workings of DNA” (Hardin, in Fishkin and 
Laslett, 2008). In parallel, it has been argued that group deliberation may lead 
to polarization (Sunstein, 2002). Such claims have been reviewed and taken 
into consideration by many authors. The theorists that have reviewed Sunstein’s 
results do not reject them, but rather accommodate them to the mechanics of 
deliberative democracy. For instance, Nabatchi, Gastil, Weiksner and Leighninger 
(2012) assert that, in spite of polarization, the outcomes of the deliberation 
process are still positive because they “tend to remind people that others’ views 
are legitimate.” Fishkin and Laslett (2008) have also argued for the usefulness 
of deliberative democracy: “Data about opinion changes in the Deliberative 
Polls confirms that there are significant changes of opinion, that these changes 
are connected to the participants becoming better informed, and that these 
changes have a big effect on the voting behaviour of the participants.” Arguably, 
the conclusion is that deliberation is effective in the sense that contributing 
to the process makes a difference both to opinion and behaviour, and also 
that “there is at least some evidence that the participants have more highly 
structured preferences (in the sense that more of them are single-peaked, so 
that they are able to collectively avoid voting cycles) and that they become more 
public-spirited, in the sense that they become more willing to make at least 
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some sacrifices in the public’s interest” (Fishkin and Laslett, 2008). And this 
is precisely how the public should react to deliberative politics if Habermas is 
right when proposing that a properly designed system of public communication 
can lead to a rationalizing effect on political processes of decision-making and, 
thus, have a greater influence on society. In this regard, it has been proved 
(Neblo et al., 2010) that willingness to deliberate is much more widespread than 
expected. It must not be forgotten, however, that people are more likely to say 
that they accept a decision as a compromise than that they have changed their 
mind (Thompson, 2008). Therefore, the major challenge still lies in expanding 
deliberative processes in society and empirically proving to what degree it 
actually contributes to a more open society. If deliberative democracy succeeds, 
deliberation processes would have legitimized once and for all communication 
power as influential to democracy.
6.  Conclusions
The first question to be considered in this paper was whether a 
European public sphere exists or not. We observed how this concept has been 
validated and rejected proportionately by many scholars, from the most sceptical 
dismissing any kind of public sphere at all, to the overwhelming optimistic 
suggesting that the European public sphere already exists. But, does it really? 
In light of our theoretical review, our first conclusion is neither a resounding yes 
nor a resounding no. While many authors have presented empirical works to 
support the existence of a European public sphere with case studies based on 
European media, it must be noted that these researches rest on a very specific 
quantitative methodology that, due to its own characteristics, cannot process 
the consequences of an ever-changing landscape between media and society. 
While enormously interesting and valid, these studies focusing on the tool and 
its contents still only represent a part of the greater picture that the potential 
European public sphere is or should be. These types of studies may as well be 
overlooking the fact that the media are just an instrument serving a specific 
power in a particular context –as Harold Innis defended in his communication 
theory essays. We still need major research on the people and their environment 
in order to be able to fully visualize the European public sphere. Therefore, the 
European public sphere may exist insofar we admit the existence of some trans-
national public discourses, but simultaneously, it may not yet exist if we consider 
these discourses not to be sufficiently extensive and profound. 
It is also necessary to raise awareness that no matter how important 
the European Union policies have become to its member states due to the recent 
crisis, the many intellectual discussions on the European public sphere appear 
to have been totally disregarded. One of the major reasons could be the fact 
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that a European public sphere apparently is not on the European Parliament’s 
agenda, and while the discussion exists, it also lacks a favourable environment 
so as not to go unnoticed. The Eurosphere project, a joint venture involving many 
scholars – some of whom have been cited in this work – is certainly an interesting 
effort to contextualize the European public sphere. Yet the comparative study of 
Eurosphere, signed by Hakan G. Sicakkan in January 2013, still admits that the 
diversity of the European publics and their complex relationships have yet to be 
overcome. In conclusion, we believe that while the European public sphere is 
most desirable, there are still many black holes of all kinds –mostly normative 
and communicative– for such a sphere to actually be representative and, more 
importantly, fully operative. The first major issue to be addressed is the notion 
of the European Union itself. Despite being a very inclusive union, its member 
states have yet to solve the serious problems affecting their internal regulations. 
In parallel, media reforms and transparency laws must be implemented as soon 
as possible in order to allow citizens to exercise their communicative power in a 
more coordinated and coherent fashion. In the meantime, a potential European 
public sphere can begin to develop, although it will continue to be invisible and 
brittle until it fulfils what is supposed to be its purpose: an interconnected and 
rational debate between Europeans.
The second question raised in this work was whether deliberative 
democracy can help to strengthen European links so as move towards a potential 
European public sphere. In this case, we conclude that deliberative democracy 
can indeed serve as a vehicle to accomplish the aforesaid purpose. Deliberative 
politics possess an incredibly powerful architecture capable of encouraging 
people to actively participate in trans-national and rational discourses. But what 
is just as important as its effects on society is the reason why we need a 
political model of this kind. If we attempt to briefly contextualize our current 
democracy, we observe the following: an apparent impossibility for consensus 
to be reached among the parties that have long resided in the left-centre-right 
conceptualization of politics; the perception that when deals are finally struck 
they are not in benefit of the people but in that of the parties themselves; and the 
inability to properly handle the so-called hot topics of multicultural societies. All 
this has resulted in a whole generation of citizens who are disenchanted with the 
current political systems. Some citizens have found an answer to this particular 
scenario in a radical reassertion of their own beliefs, subsequently leading to 
the rise of far-right and far-left movements, and threatening the basic principles 
of democracy. For others, this situation has led to a wide-open public debate 
that is recognizable in the transversal approach of social movements worldwide, 
movements whose core is intrinsically grounded on deliberative principles. 
Simultaneously, these processes are also central to an ideal, rationally driven 
public discourse. Therefore, deliberative democracy is certainly a start towards 
a European public sphere.
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